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ARGUMENT 
First Equity has offered no convincing reason why the plain lanugage of Rule 
41 (a) does not apply to bar First Equity's claims. First Equity's argument breaks down with 
the repeated assertion that it had no choice but to move for dismissal of its second-filed 
Federal court action. For instance, First Equity variously claims: 
As a result of the dismissal of the bankruptcy First Equity 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in Federal court 
and was compelled to move the court to dismiss the action. 
(Appellee's Brief at 4, emphasis added). 
In its federal court case, First Equity did not have the option that 
the plaintiffs in Braffett's heirs had, to file and elect whether to 
proceed. Instead First Equity was forced to dismiss when it 
lost jurisdiction. 
(Appellee's Brief at 7, emphasis added). 
First Equity was thereby compelled because of the dismissal 
from bankruptcy court to file a necessary motion for dismissal 
because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than a 
voluntary notice of dismissal. 
(Appellee's Brief at 9-10, emphasis added). 
First Equity ignores the fact that it had a perfectly viable option in the second-
filed case: pursue the motion to remand which it had filed with the Federal court. Instead, 
for its own reasons, First Equity voluntarily abandoned its pending motion for remand in 
favor of a motion to dismiss. 
Another aspect of this case's procedural history which remains unexplained 
by First Equity is why First Equity chose to dismiss its first-filed action in state court and file 
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the second action in Federal court. Clearly, First Equity could have pursued a motion to lift 
stay in the Phillips bankruptcy proceeding, permitting the first-filed action to go forward. 
Instead, First Equity voluntarily dismissed the first-filed state action in order to file its 
second action in Federal court. The only plausible explanation for this procedural course 
is that First Equity believed pursuing the second-filed action in Federal court would gain 
some strategic advantage. When dismissal of the bankruptcy case appeared to eliminate that 
possibility, First Equity again chose what it thought would be the most expedient method 
of pursuing its claims, instead of the procedurally correct course dictated by Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41(a). 
First Equity's opposing brief places undue reliance on the case Poloron 
Products, Inc. v. Lvbrand Ross & Montgomery. 534 F.2d 1012 (2nd Cir. 1976). In Lake at 
Las Vegas Investors Groups, v. Pacific Malibu Development Corp.. 933 F.2d 724,727 (9th 
Cir. 1991) the court recognized the limitations of the Poloron decision, noting "[the Poloron 
court's] holding, when followed, has been limited to its facts and does not preclude 
application of the bar where the voluntary dismissal is unilateral."1 
Likewise, First Equity's reliance on Thiele v. Anderson. 975 P.2d 481 (Utah 
App. 1999) is unavailing. Thiele merely notes the general purpose of Rule 41 (a)( 1) as being 
to "guard potentially adverse parties from being harassed and prejudiced by dismissal of an 
action - - e.g., being inconvenienced and investing time and financial resources for naught", 
!The Lake at Las Vegas court distinguished between unilateral and stipulated voluntary 
dismissals. First Equity's dismissal of its Federal court action was not by stipulation, but rather 
was unilaterally pursued by First Equity. 
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citing 8 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 41.10, at 41 -18 (3d ed. 1997). The 
Thiele court does not address this Court's comment in Thomas v. Braffett's Heirs. 305 P.2d 
507, 513 (Utah 1956) that: 
One may wonder how [Rule 41(a)] dismissals could vex or 
annoy a defendant who had not appeared or whether the rule is 
good or bad in its overall effect. However, we are here 
concerned only with the rule as it is, and whether the two 
dismissals act as an adjudication and preclude further litigation. 
Id. at 513. 
First Equity also falls short in its effort to distinguish the Thomas case. First 
Equity claims that Thomas may be distinguished on three grounds: first that the case 
"involved complaints and dismissals that were all filed in the same court rather than First 
Equity's action where complaints and dismissals were filed in both state and federal courts." 
(Appellee's Brief at 11). However, Rule 41(a) specifically provides that "a notice of 
dismissal operates as adjudication upon the merits when filed by plaintiff who has once 
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim." (Emphasis added). 
First Equity's second attempt to distinguish Thomas argues that in that case 
there was "no basis for dismissal . . . whereas in First Equity's action, the federal court 
ordered dismissal of the action because First Equity had lost subject matter jurisdiction when 
the bankruptcy was dismissed." (Appellee's Brief at 11) First Equity offers no citation for 
its contention that there was no basis for dismissal of the second-filed action in the Thomas 
case. The Thomas opinion does not state anything regarding the basis of the second 
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dismissal. It merely recites that "upon [two of the plaintiffs'] request that action was 
dismissed by the trial judge on October 10,1949." Thomas at 509. 
First Equity's final attempt to distinguish Thomas is equally unconvincing. 
First Equity returns to the argument adopted by the trial court which attempts to distinguish 
between perfunctory and non-perfunctory dismissals. As stated in Skabelund's opening 
brief, the Thomas court suggests that "perfunctory" means not giving adverse parties in the 
case notice of plaintiff s request for dismissal by motion or otherwise and not directing the 
attention of the court specifically to that issue. Id. at 513-514. The trial court in this case 
erred in labeling First Equity's second dismissal perfunctory, because it appears from the 
record below that First Equity's Notice of Dismissal in the first case and motion and order 
of dismissal in the Federal case were not served on any opposing party. Thomas' discussion 
of "perfunctory" dismissals does not support First Equity's argument. 
CONCLUSION 
First Equity has offered no convincing reason why the plain language of Rule 
41 (a) should not bar their action in this case. First Equity's Complaint should be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED this _J_ day of December, 2001. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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